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RELIGION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN BORDERLANDS: 
A CASE STUDY OF GREEK CATHOLICS AND HUNGARIAN 
REFORMED IN TRANSYLVANIA 
By Beth Admiraal 
Beth Admiraal received a B.A. from Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan and a Ph.D. from 
the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.  She is an associate professor of Political Science 
at King's College, a Catholic college in the Holy Cross tradition located in Wilkes-Barre, PA.  In 
addition to serving as department chair, she directs the Public Policy and Social Research 
Institute at the college. This is her second article published in OPREE. 
In the borderlands of Transylvania, the region of Romania north and west of the 
Carpathians and bordering Hungary, the postcommunist decades have showcased low-level 
contests between religious groups, each struggling to regain resources lost during the communist 
years.  The struggles have emphasized identity as much as economics and exclusion at the 
expense  of  progress.    With  the  national  government  preoccupied  with  (purportedly)  more 
pressing issues,  the intimate,  daily discourse of the local  populations in  this  border region 
suggests an eager if uncoordinated effort by politicians and the Romanian Orthodox Church 
(RoOC)—a clear majority in the region—to question the place of minority religious groups 
within the larger Romanian identity. The minority Romanian Greek Catholic Church (Greek 
Catholic, or RGCC), besieged by the Communist Party in the past, has found only limited 
support  from  newly-democratic  Romanian  politicians  who  favor  the  much  stronger  RoOC. 
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The minority (Hungarian) Reformed Church in Romania (RCR), watched suspiciously by 
the Communist Party for Hungarian nationalist activities, has found modest support for the return 
of churches but obstruction from RoOC leaders and politicians for the return of educational 
facilities; furthermore, it has faced demands to restrain its Hungarian roots in various ways. 
Despite intermittent international pressure for liberal, democratic reforms, religious minorities 
struggle, not with great intensity or violence, but in low-intensity struggles. 
These shifting fortunes for religious communities in the Transylvanian region and their 
varying responses are tightly intertwined with questions of national identity.   Which religious 
groups are “truly Romanian?” Is it better to attempt to appear “Romanian” or “other?”  Does the 
border status of these religious groups impact the identity politics? The intersection between 
minority religions and identity at the border forms the theoretical core of this paper.   As old 
fights linger and new fights emerge over which groups have claim to the Romanian identity or 
which groups pose problems for the identity, the question reemerges:  how should we understand 
nation and national identity in border regions?  This paper will begin with the larger theoretical 
question of nationhood, seeking from within the literature a fruitful way to think about the nation 
that helps to make sense of the way in which nation operates in border regions.   The second 
section applies this theory to the Greek Catholics and Reformed communities in Transylvania, 
laying out the way in which national identity and religious groups operate in one of the 
borderlands of Romania.  The article contends that border regions reveal a clearer picture of how 
national identity operates, exposing the way in which the idea of a particular nation has both 
descriptive content and is tied to practical motives.  In the end, a study of border regions, such as 
Transylvania, uncovers the tension between the descriptive and evaluative components of nation 
and offers a richer understanding of national identity. 
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How To Think About ‘Nation’ 
A nation has been generally understood to be a community that imagines itself to be 
unified as a community and holds common political objectives; thus, it is viewed as a bounded, 
identifiable group.  Many scholars rely on such “substantialist” definitions of nation, implicitly 
or explicitly, which assume that there is a groupness to nations that involves some recognizable 
and accepted features. The persistence of this substantialist characterization can be attributed to 
the recognition that nations and ethnic groups appear to be enduring, with shared traits that create 
some level of homogeneity.  For instance, the Hungarian nation is understood to be held together 
(in part) by the shared Hungarian language, which clearly distinguishes it from its neighbors. 
Such attributions function not only as describing a (perceived) reality, but encouraging the 
relevant traits:  the attempts by members of a nation to identify people as belonging to ‘people x’ 
or ‘people y’ has a way of inducing groupness through a shared trait.   Thus, this basic 
substantialist definition of nation underpins a considerable amount of the scholarship on nations, 
national identity, and nationalism. 
However, as it has been widely noted in the scholarship on nations for the past few 
decades, there is rarely a single (list of) feature(s) either invoked by or present in every group 
that  perceives  itself  as  a  nation.  To  defend  some  relatively  narrow  set  of  traits  as  truly 
constitutive of a nation is likely to look like an arbitrary act of verbal legislation, unduly 
procrustean. To incorporate each member of the lengthy catalogue into a disjunctive definition 
would result in a conception of nationhood that has very little substantive content.  And it might 
include too many people into the nation, if it suggests that any person who has at least one of the 
following . . . twenty traits . . . is, say, Romanian. A definition of nation must do more than rely 
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on substantialist grounds, according to these scholars.  Sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. 
D. Wacquant go so far as to call scholars “to resist by all means possible our primary inclination 
[which is] to think of the social world in a substantialist manner.”1 
An increasing number of scholars who have pushed beyond substantialist understandings 
 
of nation (and ethnicity) argue for a process-based understanding in which nation (and ethnicity) 
 
‘happens.’   This body of work starts with the question, "how does nation work?" rather than 
asking "what is a nation?" Rogers Brubaker, a scholar of nationalism at the forefront of this 
drive, notes that in practice, the idea of the nation is an ideal and not merely a category of 
analysis.2    In a monograph on national identity in Romania, he notes:  “A groupist reading 
conflates groups with the organizations that claim to speak and act in their name; obscures the 
generally low, though fluctuating, degree of ‘groupness’ in this setting; accepts, at least tacitly, 
the claims of nationalist politicians to speak for the groups they claim to represent; and neglects 
the everyday contexts in which ethnic and national categories take on meaning and the processes 
through which ethnicity actually ‘works’ in everyday life.”3    The process-based definition of 
nation emphasizes the variability of the nation. 
This functional understanding shows great promise.  Following from this perspective, one 
might show, for example, that an appeal to “the Romanian nation” has more than a referential 
purpose.  The speaker’s intention is not simply to bring to mind a more or less determinate group 
of people, with the implicit suggestion that they are unified by some salient traits.  Instead, the 
appeal has a practical motive.  The speaker desires to spur her fellow citizens to action, feeling, 
 
 
 
1 Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 228. 
2 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14-16. 
3 Rogers Brubaker, Margit Feischmidt, Jon Fox, and Liana Grancea, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a 
Transylvanian Town (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 9. 
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or some way of thinking by construing the encouraged action, feeling, or way of thinking as an 
implication of membership in the nation. This motive reflects the insight that the phrase “the 
Romanian nation” is connected in the popular consciousness to norms of behavior, and to 
emotional and motivational sources and mechanisms. 
This practical element is a fundamental feature of any practical identity.  To illustrate, for 
the person who fancies himself to be a good specimen of masculinity, the admonition “Be a 
man” bears a special normative authority.  This admonition rarely has anything to do with 
reminding him that he has one X and one Y chromosome.  Instead, it serves to persuade him to 
seek out an opportunity to exercise machismo.  Issued to a soldier before battle, this injunction 
serves to put out of mind any thought of flight, however grave the danger at hand.  To flee would 
be unmanly and to give up one’s right to call oneself a man thereafter.  In this way, the identity 
of manhood constrains the manly man’s behavior by ruling out options.  And it makes the bearer 
of the identity search out the opportunity to exercise (and perhaps to prove) his identity. 
The nation also works in this way. It is invoked to obtain certain kinds of behavior or 
ways of thinking; the nation operates with practical motive.  And, given that some of the 
underlying grounds of Romanian identity are not completely formed in the popular mind, and 
levels of groupness vary across time and space, the nation as identity can be dynamic, and even 
readily exploitable. A process-based definition of nation, to its credit, emphasizes how nation is 
invoked and experienced in everyday life, through such things as word choices, verbal cues, 
institutions, and rituals, enriching the literature on nations and national identity. 
However, this campaign to popularize a process-based understanding of nation, which 
rightly rejects the reifying of the nation, also brings with it potential problems.  The experience 
of communities in border regions discloses both the prescriptive and descriptive elements of 
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nation.  The term has prescriptive content:  in public discourse and in private consciousness, the 
nation brings evaluative content and a practical purpose.  However, the descriptive content is still 
evident; the invocation of the nation does call to mind a group of people and some general 
character traits.   For example, speaking about “our nation” is similar to a military general 
speaking of a particular soldier’s “courage”.   The general cannot call just anyone courageous. 
To call a soldier courageous implies that that soldier would not be motivated to act badly by fear; 
it is to attribute a descriptive property to him.  If the general calls courageous a soldier crippled 
by fear, the other soldiers will interpret the general as being either perverse, ironic, or mistaken 
about the meaning of the word. But ‘courageous’ is also a term of commendation.  For a general 
to call a soldier courageous is to praise him and possibly to commend his behavior to other 
soldiers. 
The same goes for appeals to the nation.  There are clearly constraints upon how the 
descriptive or prescriptive connotation of ‘the nation’ can be changed.  The nation is an interplay 
between various elements: a more or less determinate group of people, with the implicit 
suggestion that they are unified by some salient characteristics, a perceived membership, and 
norms or practical considerations.  Any of these elements can be altered or practiced differently, 
often affecting the other elements, but each has a determinacy about it as well. In other words, 
the idea of ‘nation Y’ is only so “flexible,” as the experience of nationhood in border regions 
illuminates so well.  A political elite generally cannot construct her desired conception of nation 
Y from scratch.  She needs to work with the descriptive content already contained in the public’s 
perception.  To borrow from metaethical terminology, the nation is a thick normative concept, 
which is to say that it has descriptive and evaluative components.   Whereas a thin normative 
term, such as ‘right’ or ‘good’ lacks much fruitful descriptive content, a thick normative term, 
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such as ‘courageous’ or ‘brutal,’ is more dense in content:  many actions or entities can be 
described as good, only a limited set can be characterized as courageous, a term that has far 
greater evaluative and descriptive richness.  The nation, similarly, operates as a thick normative 
term; thus, it is not an indeterminate category—a thin concept, as Brubaker and others seem to 
suggest—but a term with significant descriptive content and evaluative force. In this way, the 
nation is, to some degree, fixed by its descriptive content. 
Border regions both clarify and amplify the need to understand the way in which the 
nation operates akin to a thick normative term, with both fixed and dynamic aspects. The 
rootedness of national identity is a critical factor in border areas: communities make more 
attempts to find commonalities on the general contours of the nation in the presence of other, 
often dominant, groups or when confronted by minority groups that threaten the territorial 
integrity of the region.  Elites often have a vested interest in giving structure and permanency to 
a ‘group’ in order to maintain control and engender loyalty within the group.  To overlook the 
embedded element of the nation in a border region is to miss (as badly as the EU optimists!) the 
historical continuity and staying power of a nation. At the same time, however, the nation, in its 
substantive and prescriptive connotations, does change over the course of time, fluctuate at the 
margins, and it does—to use Brubaker’s language—work changeably at the “everyday” level, 
though even here, only within limits.  Elites, for example, will find it advantageous to toy with 
the popular understanding of the nation, more so in border regions where national identity has 
significant import, to improve their own positions or improve the prospects of their community. 
In sum, the process-based definition can signal how a nation is experienced and transforms, but it 
neglects the way in which the nation is perceived by people to exist, where there is a general 
understanding of what it means to be in a nation and what kinds of character traits and practices 
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are accepted or rejected for membership in the nation.  To accept the process-based definition of 
nation without recognizing that there is a descriptive content to groups that is broadly recognized 
and accepted is to overemphasize the dynamism. 
The fixedness and flexibility—simultaneously—can be seen very readily in many parts of 
Eastern Europe, which has been a fault line for so many questions and issues in political 
organization and where border regions are prevalent. One of the most conceptually muddled— 
and yet politically calm—border regions in which questions of nation are paramount is 
Transylvania.   In particular, the interplay between national identity and religious belief and 
behavior in Transylvania suggests nations, particularly in borderlands, should be studied in both 
fixed and dynamic terms.  In this region, one can trace invocations of nation, through which 
groupness is invented and reinvented, yet the content is only modestly and slowly shifted. The 
following  section  exhibits  how  this  theoretical  framework  can  be  fruitfully  applied  to  the 
thinking of Greek Catholics and Hungarian Reformed religious leaders who find themselves in a 
border region in postcommunist Transylvania, Romania. 
The Greek Catholics in Transylvania 
Transylvania’s history involves incorporation into many different empires but never 
independence.  It constituted the core of the province of Dacia in the Roman Empire; it was an 
integral part of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary; subsequently, it became an autonomous 
principality under Turkish protection.  In the mid-seventeenth century, it was incorporated into 
the Hapsburg Empire, enveloped into the nineteenth-century Hungarian state and then became 
part of Romania in 1918. Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, this 
multireligious,  multiethnic  region  has  engendered  chronic  tension  between  Hungary  and 
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Romania, among the various religious and ethnic groups, and between the seat of power in 
Bucharest and regional and local officials. 
The Greek Catholic Church in Romania (RGCC) emerged in 1700, when the Hapsburg 
invasion of Transylvania forty years prior induced members of the Romanian Orthodox Church 
hierarchy in this region to accept the authority of the papacy and enter into communion with the 
See of Rome without needing to forfeit their Orthodox rituals.  In addition, the RGCC was 
permitted to use the Romanian language in services at a time when the Romanian Orthodox 
Church relied on Old Church Slavonic. The Greek Catholic hierarchy established the 
Transylvanian School in the 18th century, a vehicle for articulating the contours of the Romanian 
identity, thereby becoming “a vocal class expressing ‘national’ aspiration.”4 Romanian Orthodox 
then and now assert that Greek Catholics converted due to foreign coercion; whether or not this 
is true, the historical role of the Greek Catholics in forging a Romanian identity suggests that 
their loyalties remained eastward-facing. This role in developing a national consciousness was 
eventually usurped by the Romanian Orthodox, who, according to Romanian scholars Lavinia 
Stan and Lucian Turcescu, “borrowed, and eventually monopolized, the Transylvanian Greek 
Catholics’ nationalist discourse centered on the Latin character of the Romanian language and 
descent.”5    Even having been supplanted as the leading role in forming the nation, the Greek 
Catholic Church was awarded the status of a second national church in the 1923 constitution 
precisely because of its role in Romania’s national movement. The number of Greek Catholics 
placed them consistently in the minority—in the 1930 census, around eight percent of Romania’s 
4 Denis Hupchick, Conflict and Chaos in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 74. 
5 Lavinia Stan and  Lucian Turcescu, Religion and Politics in Post-communist Romania (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 43. 
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population designated itself as Greek Catholic6--but they remained politically influential up until 
the communist revolution.  In fact, many leaders in the National Peasant Party, one of two main 
parties  in  Romania  during  the  interwar  period,  were  Greek  Catholic.    For  two  and  a  half 
centuries, the idea of the Romanian nation included both the Orthodox and Greek Catholic 
communities, establishing a fixed sensibility of the religious content of the nation. 
The Communist period ushered in the first systematic, widespread assault on the Greek 
Catholic population in Romania. The Church’s spiritual allegiance to Rome and the anti- 
government hostility of Greek Catholic clergy led the Romanian Worker’s Party, under the 
leadership of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, to unveil an openly antagonistic position towards the 
Vatican and the Catholic Church in Romania.7 In 1948, the Greek Catholic Church was formally 
disbanded and the Party began an aggressive campaign to vilify the Church with the objective of 
eliminating any claim to the Romanian identity. The nation, as it was envisioned by Gheorghiu- 
Dej and his successor, Nicolae Ceaușescu, could only be identified as Orthodox—not Greek 
Catholic—and, at that, even the Romanian Orthodox Church faced periods of repression by the 
Communist Party. Through a series of laws, the Party gave the bulk of Greek Catholic churches 
to the Romanian Orthodox Church while the rest of its property went to the state. The Greek 
Catholic Church survived only in and through underground networks and from within the RoOC, 
which absorbed many of its members. 
With the collapse of the communist regime in late 1989, the Greek Catholic Church in 
Romania reemerged both physically and legally.   Yet, despite the official recognition, the old 
scenario  was  not  restored:  the Church  faced  a  complete deficit  of  property,  an  evaporated 
 
 
6  The General Census of the Population of Romania, Recensa˘mantul General al Populat i¸ei Romaˆniei,Central 
Statistical Ofﬁce [Directia Generala de Statistica], Bucharest, 1930. 
7  Cristian Vasile, “The Suppression of the Romanian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church,” East European Quarterly 
XXXVI, no. 3 (September 2002), 313-322. 
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community, and no clear state supporters. It called for restitution in integrum—immediate and 
complete return of all property—as a starting point for recovery.  Beginning in 1990, though, the 
process of returning this property to the RGCC has been slow, due in part to resistance on the 
part of the RoOC, but also because some of this property was transformed into museums and 
public cultural houses.8    The Romanian government set up an organization to oversee the 
restitution of public property—the Special Restitution Commission (SRC)—but its decisions are 
often ignored by local authorities or priests in the RoOC, or the judicial system has overturned 
these decisions. The International Religious Freedom Report (IRFR) registers that by 2010, the 
SRC had returned 130 of more than 6,000 properties under its control and offered compensation 
in 41 other cases on paper, but the actual turnover rate has been lower.9 There have been only a 
handful of additional properties returned to the RGCC since the IRFP’s last accounting.10   And 
 
as the Greek Catholics argued for restitution, all the while the Orthodox received aid. With this 
state funding, the RoOC has been on a building spree: according to a report from the BBC in 
2013, the RoOC has been putting up churches “at a rate of one every three days;” in addition, it 
is constructing, largely with taxpayer money, the Cathedral for the People’s Salvation in 
Bucharest, slated to be the tallest religious building in all of southeastern Europe.11 The property 
restitution difficulties faced by the RGCC contrasted with the tax-payer funded RoOC church- 
building efforts suggest that the religious content of the Romanian nation might include today, 
only Orthodoxy. 
 
 
8 For a detailed overview of the debate over property restitution for Greek Catholics and the status of restitution up 
until 2005, see Stan and Turcescu, Religion and Politics, 97-117. 
9 US State Department, International Religious Freedom Report: Romania, 2010. 
10 The most recent report from the US State Department does not tally the return of church properties to the RGCC, 
but it does highlight instances where court-ordered returns of church buildings to the RGCC has not been executed 
by government officials. See International Religious Freedom Report: Romania, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper. 
11   Tessa  Dunlop,  “Romania's  costly  passion  for  building  churches,”  BBC  News,  Romania,  August  6,  2013. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-23420668. 
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The Greek Catholic Church has reported other forms of overt discrimination, including 
impediments to putting up new buildings, refusals to allow it to take part in public events (to 
which the RoOC is invited), and difficulties finding burial space in public cemeteries.  In an 
analysis of contemporary church-state relations in Romania, Iuliana Conovici writes: “While the 
State professes to be “neutral” with respect to religious belief (or the lack thereof), this notion is 
the equivalent of “benevolent support,” with a preference for large religious communities, and 
with an even more marked practical bias towards the largest of them, namely the Romanian 
Orthodox Church  . . . .”12   The RoOC, though failing to garner status as the national church in 
legislation, has inserted such language into its own statutes, beginning in 2008 with the claim, in 
article 5.2:  “The Romanian Orthodox Church is the Church of the Romanian nation.” 
Overall, the RoOC has kept a distinct financial edge over all other churches in the fight 
for state funding and state-sponsored roles. Again, Conovici notes: 
The principle of ‘proportionality’ of State support in the distribution of institutional, 
legal, and financial advantages (even qualified by the State’s pretention to understand the “real 
needs of religious denominations”) allowed for a de facto dominance of the Orthodox Church in 
several areas, particularly in the fields of religious assistance in public institutions and religious 
education in the public education system.13 
The social and economic disparity results from a view of Orthodoxy as the religion of Romania, 
and  other  religions—including  the  Greek  Catholic—as  less  relevant  or  irrelevant  to  the 
Romanian nation. 
A shift in the understanding of the Romanian identity emerges in this favoritism towards 
the RoOC and discrimination against the RGCC, in which the RoOC is invoking a view of the 
Romanian nation as one that does include the Greek Catholics. Since those in the Greek Catholic 
12  Iuliana Conovici , “Concepts of Church-State relations in Romania: beyond symphonia and the ‘privileged 
OrthodoxChurch,’” 
http://www.units.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/conferences/documents/Religion%20YRC/Conovici-Beyond- 
symphonia.pdf, 16. 
13 Iuliana Conovici , “Concepts of Church-State relations in Romania,” 14-15. 
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church are missing a now recognized and broadly accepted marker of Romanian identity— 
 
namely membership in the Romanian Orthodox Church—this opens the door to the invocation of 
 
'Romanian' with new exclusionary borders that leave out Greek Catholics, a continuation of 
communist efforts, though by new or transformed elites, with new motives.  The contestation in 
this  borderland  region,  where  the  Romanian  identity  faces  more  threats  than  elsewhere, 
highlights the way in which political and religious elites will advocate for a modification of the 
long-established view of the content of the nation. 
In addition to the historical understanding of the Romanian Orthodox Church as the 
centerpiece of the Romanian nation, with Greek Catholicism excluded from the community, 
religious elites are finding more dynamic ways to reinvent the Romanian nation as exclusive of 
Greek Catholics in an overt, though sporadic, effort to convince Orthodox believers that Greek 
Catholics are, in fact, Hungarian.  This reestablishment of a Romanian identity without Greek 
Catholics—by labeling them Hungarian—is a charge leveled against Orthodox priests through 
Transylvania,  and  appears  to  be  increasingly  accepted  by  Orthodox  believers,  particularly 
(though not exclusively) in rural areas.14 The effort to reinvent Greek Catholics as Hungarians is 
motivated by a quest to make the RoOC the only religious marker for the Romanian nation.  This 
crusade was publicly denounced by the Social Democrat and popular movie director, Sergiu 
Nicolaescu, who accused the Orthodox of abusing the rights and property of Greek Catholics: 
“By accepting that ‘Romanian’ equals ‘Orthodox,’ and ‘Catholic’ equals ‘Hungarian’, we negate 
the beginning of Christianity on our territory and the contribution of the Greek Catholic faith to 
the liberation of Transylvanian Romanians during the first half of the 18th century . . . . Are these 
Greek  Catholics  not  Romanians  because  they  have  different  Christian  beliefs?!”15    The 
 
 
 
14 Dan Ruscu, University of Babes-Bolyai, Interview with author, October 2011. 
15 Quoted in Stan and Turcescu, Religion and Politics,” 105. 
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invocation of Greek Catholics as not Romanian, but Hungarian represents a more dynamic shape 
to the understanding of nation, in which the invocation of Greek Catholics as Hungarian may, 
slowly, shift the contours of ‘Romanian’ and ‘Hungarian’. 
The treatment of the Greek Catholic Church by the RoOC and Romanian authorities is 
reported by some to be far worse than the experience of other religious groups, even those that 
materialized in Romania more recently.16   Denied the protection of the state, the RGGC has had 
difficulties that extend to the official counting in the census reports. In the 2002 census, the 
official number of RGGC adherents stood at only 200,000, far less than the 1.4 million declared 
by the Vatican. Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu surmise that the census miscalculates the 
actual number, though it is nowhere in the vicinity of 1.4 million.17 According to Frans 
Hoppenbouwers, who offers a detailed report of the situation of the Greek Catholics in the post- 
communist era, “Enquirers [census workers] allegedly refused to take down the answers of 
Greek Catholic believers during the [2002] survey.”18   A repeat census in 2011 reports just over 
150,000 Greek Catholics, rekindling criticism about the integrity of the census reporting. Though 
the extent to which the census underreports Greek Catholics is not known, the numerous 
complaints about the reporting and the surprising drop in the numbers suggest that either there is 
an effort to undermine the Greek Catholic community in the census, or that the RGCC’s numbers 
are diminishing due to the years of difficulties in retrieving property, discrimination, and 
decreasing financial help from the state (ironically tied to census numbers). 
The identity politics playing out between the Greek Catholics and Romanian Orthodox, 
16  For one example, see Gabriel Andreescu, “The Romanian Church United with Rome (Greek-Catholic) under 
Pressure: The Roc's Bad Behavior as Good Politics,” Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 11, no. 32 
(2012). 
17 Stan and Turcescu, Religion and Politics, 94-95. 
18 Frans Hoppenbrouwers, “The Greek Catholic Church in Romania,” Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 58 no. 1- 
2, 125-136: 125. 
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with the state largely standing on the side of the Orthodox, has not erupted into a violent conflict 
in Transylvania.   Yet, the border region of Transylvania is loaded with perilous anxiety, a site of 
a historical and ongoing tug-of-war for property and identity rights. Although there has been 
much less anger between ethnic and religious groups in the region over the last decade, the 
potential for renewed confrontation exists.  As Rogers Brubaker writes about Cluj in particular 
and Transylvania in general, “Social life is powerfully, though unevenly, structured along ethnic 
lines; and ethnic and national categories are part of the taken-for-granted framework of social 
and political experience. Nations, nationhood (or “nationness”) “happen” every day in Cluj, even 
if many such happenings are invisible or uninteresting to students of collective action or ethnic 
violence.”19 These seemingly small-stuff efforts to marginalize Greek Catholics by labeling them 
 
Hungarian from the pulpits, depriving them of their property, and excluding them from public 
life might lead, quite easily, into a reestablishment of the Romanian identity into something that 
does not include Greek Catholics.  The nation is a dynamic process that involves construction 
and reinvention on the ground; yet, the descriptive elements are not easily shifted.  The fixedness 
remains; even as verbal cues and aggressive discrimination work to displace the Greek Catholics 
from the Romanian identity, the historical memory of the importance of the Greek Catholics as 
leaders in the Romanian nationalism movement make this a tough sell.  This is not to suggest 
that the Romanian nation is a homogenous and bounded group; rather, it is to suggest that those 
practicing the nation accept, in broad contours, a view of the nation, and this acceptance brings 
historical continuity and everyday groupness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 Rogers Brubaker, et.al., Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity: 6. 
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The Reformed Church in Romania 
 
The historical position of the Reformed Church in Romania (RCR), often referred to 
today as the Hungarian Reformed Church for its roots in the Hungarian community, differs 
considerably from that of the Greek Catholics.  The Hungarian Reformed community emerged in 
the mid-16th century with the Protestant Reformation, initially with Lutheran tendencies but 
increasingly open to Calvinism, and within two decades, the Reformed faith had taken root in the 
region of Transylvania. The Kingdom of Hungary controlled and administered the Transylvanian 
territory until the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, after which it was considered independent but still 
tightly connected to Hungary through Hungarian princes aligned with the Reformed (Calvinist) 
tradition.   Even after Hapsburg acquisition in 1683 at the Battle of Vienna and subsequent 
catholicization efforts in Transylvania, the Reformed Church persisted alongside the Lutherans 
(largely German), given relative freedom by the Hapsburg administration. In 1867, with the 
establishment of a dual monarchy, Transylvania was officially enveloped in the Kingdom of 
Hungary, and the Reformed Church prospered, aided by the official policies of Magyarization. 
Throughout these political changes, the Reformed Church remained an integral piece of the 
Hungarian identity in the region of Transylvania. 
While Transylvania was officially a part of Hungary into the early twentieth century, the 
population was multiethnic.  In the census of 1910, 54 percent of the population of Transylvania 
identified themselves as Romanian speakers, as opposed to 32 percent Hungarian-speaking and 
11 percent German-speaking.  The ethnic distribution justified the decision of the Allied Powers, 
in the peace agreement at the end of WWI, to weaken Hungary by apportioning out Hungarian 
land to surrounding states. Thus, Transylvania was given over to Romania. This critical shift in 
the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 created a completely altered border region in which the Hungarian 
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population, around half of whom were identified as Hungarian Reformed, were folded into a new 
political structure in a much disadvantaged position. 
The Reformed Church in Romania fared only moderately better than the Greek Catholic 
community under communism.  Although it was not formally disbanded, and thus able to hold 
worship services, it lost hundreds of schools, including primary schools, high schools, and 
colleges; theological education was restricted, budgets were monitored, and church personnel 
were monitored in their activities.  After the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the Romanian state 
intensified its persecution of the ‘Hungarian’ Reformed Church, accusing it of organizing efforts 
to rejoin Hungary. The most intense persecution ended by the early 1960s, but low-level 
harassment and discrimination continued throughout the communist era, mainly focused on 
pastors and candidates for pastoral training whose work was severely hampered by the 
Communist Party. 
The Reformed Church in Romania, alongside the other Hungarian religious groups in the 
Transylvanian region, has had modest success in advocating for its rights and resources in the 
postcommunist era.  The RCR has been able to secure some access to educational institutions, 
social services, and—to a lesser extent—cultural spaces.  In the area of education, in particular, 
the RCR has managed to set up schools, including universities, with Hungarian as the primary 
language of instruction.   Yet, the concerns are real, and many of them are connected with 
property restitution:  properties that were lost by the Reformed community during the communist 
era, primarily converted into public space, have only partially been returned; others that are 
slated for return to the Church have been caught in endless litigation.20   In general, the broader 
20 The current bishop of the Transylvanian Reformed Church District, Béla Kató, remarked in February, 2014: “Our 
contact might be sufficient in a formal way but its content has not convinced us that we are treated on equal terms 
with the Orthodox Church, which without being officially admitted, operates as a state church, and this means 
several privileges for it. We just have to think of the special arrangements between the state and the Orthodox 
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concerns of the RCR, as well as all other religious minority groups, are over favoritism towards 
the RoOC in such areas as the allocation of state funds (particularly off-budget funds), 
opportunities to take part in charitable events, and a favored position in the teaching of religion 
in public schools. 
While both the Reformed and the Greek Catholic churches struggle for better access to 
public goods and space, and a return of confiscated property, the RCR is in a sharply different 
position with respect to the Romanian identity.  The Romanian identity, as it is historically 
understood and experienced in daily life, has not included the RCR, or, for that matter, the other 
Hungarian religious groups.  As such, the RCR represents less of a threat to the RoOC than the 
Greek Catholics, and the critical fight of the RCR is largely to minimize its exclusion from the 
advantages secured by being Romanian.  Crucially, in this battle, some within the RCR are 
gauging the advantages of putting space between the Reformed community and its Hungarian 
identity—reinventing their identity—even while Greek Catholics face the prospect of being 
reinvented by political elite and the RoOC, unsolicited. 
The reengineering project of some within the Reformed Church of Romania, though 
limited in scope and effort, offers valuable insight into the way in which the nation operates 
within borderlands, which is to say akin to a thick normative concept with significant descriptive 
content and evaluative force, but still with flexibility. The RCR, rather than try to appear more 
Romanian, which given the embedded traits of Romanian and Hungarian would be protracted 
and arduous, is at times engaging in efforts to detach from its counterparts in Hungary, pushing 
Church in the fields of education and social work. Not to mention that with state support 800 orthodox churches are 
being built in Romania at the same time, while we could hardly finish our 2-3 small churches. The state does not 
acknowledge the more than hundred-year old traditions of the Reformed education either, which is a constant source 
of tension between us, and it does not give us enough support to maintain our social institutions. Of course we could 
manage with financing our institutions on our own, with the financial retransfer, but the state apparatus hinders this, 
as much as possible. We could only get back one of our real estates in Cluj-Napoca after 12 years of litigation, 
which was an enormous waste of time and money for us.”  See Kató,“Over the Border: Interest in Unity,” February 
6, 2014, http://reformatus.hu/mutat/9206/. 
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slowly for a new ‘Transylvanian’ identity.  While the Romanian identity is descriptively “fixed” 
in a way that makes shoe-horning the Hungarian Reformed community into the concept an 
unlikely prospect, there are political reasons not to try to identify, too directly, with the state of 
Hungary.  The efforts of the RCR during the postcommunist era suggest that some members of 
the Hungarian Reformed community are considering a Transylvanian identity even while trying 
to ensure that Romania becomes a committed (pluralist) democracy that accommodates many 
groups. 
The historical basis for ‘Transylvanianism’ goes back to the post-Trianon era, when a 
group of intellectuals, Hungarian and Romanian, nurtured a distinctive identity for the region, as 
opposed to wholesale identification with either the Hungarian or the Romanian state or culture.21 
This movement has reappeared recently in Transylvania, with formal associations, informal 
 
meetings, or simply online groups, that are molding a regional identity of ‘Transylvanian’ apart 
from the identities of Romanian, Hungarian, etc.  Some of these are driven by Hungarians but 
more recent groups claim primarily Romanian or mixed membership.22    As overviewed below, 
however, public support for Transylvanian autonomy, particularly by those who identify 
themselves (also) as Romanian, is low. 
These pro-Transylvanian groups may over time be successful at creating a significant 
Transylvanian identity; this section, however, focuses on the potential for a new Transylvanian 
identity arising out of a religious context.   In particular, the problems faced by the Reformed 
Church in Romania, and its response to a situation that remains tense, appears to be driving it to 
revisit this historical endeavor and contemplate the possibilities of a new identity. 
 
21  For an account of this development, see Piroska Balogh, “Transilvanismus: Revizió vagy regionalizmus.” 156- 
174” in Trianon é s a Magyar politikai gondolkodás, 1920-1953: Tanulmányok,   ed Ignác Romsics. Budapesta: 
Osiris Kiadó. 
22   For example, the Democratic League of Transylvania (in Romanian, Liga Transilvania Democrată), which 
supports the Autonomy for Transylvania campaign, has solid Romanian membership. 
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One  of  the  most  forceful  voices  in  the  effort  to  reposition  Hungarians  within 
Transylvania is a bishop in the Reformed Church in Romania, László Tőkés, whose actions as a 
pastor in Timişoara in 1989 triggered the overthrow of Nicolae Ceauşescu and the end of the 
communist period in Romania.  Tőkés, currently an independent representative in the European 
Parliament, is a member of the Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania, a small party that aims 
for autonomy, even independence, for Transylvania constructed on its Hungarian minority. He 
promotes such autonomy based on the Kosovo precedent, highlighting persecution of Hungarians 
in Transylvania both to a domestic and international audience, and even resorting to hyperbolic 
language of a future ‘Kingdom of Transylvania.’  In addition to the example of Kosovo, he has 
also held up Palestinians as a model, who, he says, have based their demand for autonomy on the 
principle of ‘peace for territory’.23   Tőkés invokes the Hungarian nation as a basis for autonomy, 
but   the   language   stretches   towards   a   reinvention   of   Hungarians   in   Transylvania   as 
‘Transylvanians’ who, though tightly connected to Hungary, can create a space—and identity— 
of its own. 
László Tőkés’s calls for autonomy play out particularly well in the Székely Land (in 
Romanian, this land is referred to as Ţinutul Secuiesc), a region within Transylvania that is 
inhabited by a Hungarian-speaking population associated with the frontier of the Hungarian 
Kingdom,  who  identify  themselves  variously  as  Hungarian  or  Székely.  Three  counties  in 
Romania are settled by the Székely people: Harghita and Covasna, with a majority Székely 
population, and Mures, of which approximately half is considered Székely land.   In 2013, the 
call for autonomy swelled when the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zsolt Nemeth, stated 
that Hungary would use diplomatic means to counter the Romanian authority’s decision to ban 
23"Kosovo model for Transylvania," B92, March 10, 2008, 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=03&dd=10&nav_id=48330. 
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the Székely flag from flying on administrative buildings anywhere in Romania.  This decision 
against the Székely flag from Bucharest came in response to an easing of restrictions by the 
Hungarian government on the granting of Hungarian citizenship to Hungarians in Romania.  This 
offer of Hungarian citizenship was eagerly accepted by many Székely, including the elected 
presidents of the County Councils of the three counties in which the Székely population 
dominates.   The Hungarian government might have in mind eventual territorial reunification 
with Transyvlania, but within Transylvania, there are few serious efforts at reunification with 
Hungary.  Instead, efforts are directed towards autonomy—even independence—from Romania. 
This autonomy is based loosely in the Hungarian identity, but without strong networks and 
shared institutions between the Székely people and other Hungarians in Transylvania, it is not a 
principally Hungarian project. 
The Reformed Church in Romania, while not actively calling for formal independence 
for the Székely communities, plays several roles in promoting autonomy: for one, it is active in 
fighting for the return of church property, a substantial proportion of it in Székely Land. By 
extension, then, the Reformed Church positions itself on the side of the Székely against the 
Romanian authorities.  For example, Bishop Béla Kató of the Transylvanian Reformed Church 
District (one of two districts that make up the RCR), released a memo in early 2014 calling for 
international support for the RCR, which recently lost an appeal for the return of Székely Mikó 
Reformed High School, a school that was given back to the Transylvanian Reformed church 
district in 1999 but then returned back to the Romanian state in June of 2012.  He writes, “We 
recognize with bitter displeasure that the Romanian administration of justice and current political 
powers will polish their worn prestige by once more taking away – based on half-truths and false 
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testimonies – what was already lawfully returned . . ."24.   More directly, the RCR has supported 
demonstrations for self-governance in these areas.  The newsletter for the Reformed Church in 
Hungary, posted the following notice: 
Szekerland's pursuit of self-governance has been met with widespread support from all 
Hungarian political parties and churches in Romania. Ecumenical services were held 
before the demonstration in 14 cities, showing strong support from the religious 
community regardless of denomination. Bishop Béla Kató, similarly to other church 
leaders in the country, encouraged congregations to participate in the demonstration. 
Church  leaders  in  Romania  emphasized  that  the  pursuit  of  this  goal  is  a  peaceful 
endeavor which serves not only the ethnic Hungarians interest, but the peaceful 
cohabitation and prosperity in Transylvania and Romania.25 
This show of support for the Székelys focuses on Hungarian groups in Romania, for a group 
that both positions itself within the Hungarian nation but also distinguishes itself in dialect, 
customs, and historical memory. As to the latter, the Székelys’ national anthem, itself, references 
an alternative history: that the Székelys are descendants of Attila’s Huns. It should not be 
assumed that self-governance in the Székely Lands means automatic subservience to Hungary. 
The Reformed Church in Romania, in addition to promoting distance between itself and a 
problematic  Hungarian   identity  within  Romania,  has  found   itself  disadvantaged  in  its 
relationship with the Reformed Church in Hungary. This space between the two entities dates to 
1990, when it re-engaged with the greater Hungarian Reformed Communities with whom it was 
severed during the communist era.  The reconvergence of the Hungarian Reformed communities 
has involved not only complicated church politics, but also questions of identity and place. Some 
of this can be seen in organizational structures and behavior. With the fall of communism, the 
Hungarian Reformed Church, released from legal constraints, formed a new organization, the 
24 “Battle Over Church-Owned Property Still Ongoing in Romania,” Reformed Church in Romania, 
January 21, 2014, http://reformatus.hu/mutat/updated-battle-over-church-owned-property-still-ongoing-in-romania/. 
25 “Hungarians in Transylvania Appeal for Autonomy,” Reformed Church in Romania, November 4, 2013, 
http://reformatus.hu/mutat/8838/. 
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Consultative Synod of the Hungarian Reformed Churches.  This organization, with full legal 
status, included all of the districts of the historical HRC, including the two districts in 
Transylvania.  However, in 2005, a counter organization—the General Convent—was built by 
the bishop of the Dunamelleki Reformed Church District, headquartered in Budapest, and then 
joined by the bishop of the second most-powerful district in the Church, the Tiszantuli Reformed 
Church District, headquartered in Debrecen. Although the Reformed districts in Transylvania 
joined the newly formed General Convent, its seat of power is clearly in Hungary. Hungarian 
scholar, Robert Hunlich, notes, “They [the two  districts in Transylvania] see that  someone 
always wants to represent them without asking if it is needed.”26 In addition, the constitution of 
the General Convent was signed after general assemblies in each of the four church districts in 
Hungary, but without general assemblies in the districts outside of Hungary who were 
nevertheless asked to sign on. Other voices in the Reformed Church echo the view that the 
Hungarian Reformed Churches outside of Hungary feel, at times, isolated from the Hungarian 
Reformed  Church  within  Hungary.  George  deVuyst,  an  American  missionary  with  the 
Hungarian Reformed Church, concedes that the Hungarian Reformed in Ukraine and Romania 
feel “unappreciated for their struggles.”27    Thus, the sentiment that the Reformed Church in 
Romania should reinvent itself as Transylvanian, as a matter of identity, is not a surprising 
response to rejection from Romanian identity and marginalization from Hungarian society.  This 
embryonic  shift—while  still  tentative  and  impossible  to  quantify—suggests  that  there  is 
flexibility in the content of a nation, with clear efforts to fill content in the idea of Transylvania. 
And yet, there are constraints on how the descriptive and prescriptive connotations of a nation 
can be changed: the Hungarian state’s overtures to Hungarians abroad, the ecclesiastical ties of 
 
 
 
26 Robert Hunlich, Written interview with author, March 2014. 
27 George DeVuyst, Interview with author, March 2014. 
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the RCR to the Hungarian Reformed Church broadly speaking, the overlap in language and 
customs, and the historical bonds are not easily relinquished or forgotten.  The borderland status 
of the RCR amplifies both a fixed and a flexible aspect of nation. 
Apart from institutional issues within the Reformed Church in Romania, an additional 
complication  resides  both  within  the  Church  and  outside  of  it.    In  1903,  the  International 
Christian Endeavour Movement, an evangelical Christian youth-oriented movement, set up a 
branch in Hungary, which then included the territory of Transylvania, working from within the 
Reformed communities.  During the communist era, the Christian Endeavor (CE) Association, as 
it was called in Romania then, played a critical role in the underground movement against the 
government, and for their resistance, popularity, and connection with the Hungarian Reformed, 
became  key  targets  of  the  Romanian  Communist  Party.28   Thus,  following  the  collapse  of 
communism, this group emerged with a trump card over the official leaders in the RCR, among 
which there were higher levels of collaboration with the Romanian Communist authorities. This 
moral authority boosted the membership of the CE movement after 1990, even promulgating a 
CE member to the level of bishop of the Transylvanian Reformed Church District, one of the two 
Transylvanian districts of the RCR. Today, the CE movement, while not in any official role in 
the hierarchy, hosts Bible studies, community events, and children’s camps. Those outside of the 
movement have expressed dissatisfaction with what it sees as a non-collaborative nature.  Jozsef- 
Tamas Soós, a pastor at a church outside of Oradea, argues that the “members of the CE 
Movement call themselves the true Christians, not true Reformed” and “take advantage of the 
[Reformed] Church and are out only to catch people for their own movement.”29    The CE 
Movement, in addition to provoking the non-CE sector of the Reformed Church in Romania, is 
 
 
 
28 Hunlich, March 2014. 
29 Jozsef-Tamas Soós, Interview with author, March 2014. 
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more evangelical in style and sentiment, which led to its decision to translate the historical 
Reformed  confessions  into  Romanian  and  start  a  Romanian-speaking  mission.    As  Robert 
Hunlich concludes, “The conventional part of the church [the non-CE part] has seen this as the 
first step towards assimilation.”30   Although it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about 
the impact of the CE movement on the Reformed Church in Romania at this juncture, it may be 
one of the prompts for the Church to stress its Transylvanian heritage—and even emphasize this 
as an identity—in the face of a community that can claim the mantle of ‘solidly Hungarian’ 
because of its persecution by the Romanian Communist authorities even while it is embracing 
the Romanian population. In seeking to reformulate itself as the Reformed of Transylvania, the 
RCR is exhibiting the opportunities for reinventing the nation. The long-drawn-out process and 
subdued response to the project reveal the constraints on such efforts. 
Rogers Brubaker, et.al., found that Hungarians reflexively support Transylvanian 
autonomy while the Romanian elite in Transylvania rejects it.  The Romanian Clujenis’ view, as 
a whole, depends on the framing of the question:  if autonomy is introduced in the context of 
tension between Transylvania and Bucharest, there is strong support; if raised in ethnonational 
terms, there is strong disapproval of autonomy among Romanians in Cluj.31 It is not clear if the 
Hungarian  Reformed  community  and  church  officials’  view  of  autonomy  differs  from  the 
position of the larger Hungarian community in Transylvania, but the church, as a repository for 
Hungarian identity,  would undoubtedly offer a basis for autonomy in  strictly ethnonational 
terms, as a matter of (Hungarian) Transylvanian versus Romanian. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 Hunlich, March 2014. 
31 Brubaker, et al. Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity, 346-350. 
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Conclusion 
 
The experience of the Greek Catholic and Reformed communities in Transylvania, both 
of which inhabit a borderland that raises the stakes of identity and religious markers of identity, 
suggests that we should accept neither a wholehearted substantialist nor a process-based view of 
the nation.   The nation—in its descriptive and prescriptive elements—is often perceived as a 
fixed entity by those within and outside of the group; likewise, the way in which nation is 
invoked and prescribed, suggests flexibility in the way it is experienced and, over time, this can 
lead to significant changes.  The nation is not a homogenous, unchanging group; neither is it an 
entirely dynamic process without limitations on the way in which it is invoked.  The RGCC, as it 
responds to attempts by hierarchy in the RoOC and government officials to ‘kick it out’ of the 
Romanian identity and, even more extremely, turn RGCC members into Hungarians, can rely on 
a history of being seen as a significant component of Romanian identity and even postcommunist 
legislation and actions that give it legal status with support from the state on paper. Likewise, the 
Reformed Church in Romania, as it responds to feelings of isolation both from the Romanian 
identity and, in some instances from life in Hungary, can raise the specter of a Transylvanian 
identity, but not without resting partially on its Hungarian past and present.  The nation, akin to a 
thick normative concept, has significant descriptive content and evaluative force that, though 
experienced in numerous ways across time and space and with the possibility for gradual change, 
is constrained by historical and contemporary stabilizing forces. 
